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Long	Read:	Sowing	seeds	of	ethnic	division?
Afghanistan’s	constitution	and	electoral	system
Meetra	Qutb	(Independent	Researcher	and	Consultant,	UK)	explains	how	Afghanistan’s	constitution	promotes
ethnic	divisions	in	the	country	through	the	establishment	of	a	highly	centralised	form	of	government,	as	well	as
adopting	electoral	systems	that	do	not	enable	a	true	political	reflection	of	the	diversity	of	Afghan	society.
Afghanistan	is	a	multi-ethnic	and	multi-lingual	country.	Due	to	the	decades	of	war,	there	exists	no	accurate	census
on	its	population,	especially	with	regards	to	the	size	of	each	ethnic	group.	But	one	thing	is	known:	one	ethnic	group
is	not	big	enough	to	form	a	majority,	rather	the	country	is	made	up	of	several	different	ethnic	groups.
In	Article	4	of	Afghanistan’s	constitution,	14	ethnic	groups	are	mentioned:	Pashtun,	Tajik,	Hazara,	Uzbek,	Turkman,
Baluch,	Pachaie,	Nuristani,	Aymaq,	Arab,	Qirghiz,	Qizilbash,	Gujur,	Brahwui	and	Other	Tribes.	The	first	five	groups
are	large	communities	and	play	a	prominent	role	in	the	country’s	political	life.	Pashtuns,	the	largest	group,	however,
have	historically	asserted	a	“right	to	rule”.	Estimates	of	their	size	vary	between	32-42	per	cent	of	the	entire
population.
On	the	other	hand,	Afghanistan	is	virtually	a	religiously	homogeneous	country:	its	population	is	estimated	to	be	99
per	cent	Muslim,	including	84-89	per	cent	Sunni,	10-15	per	cent	Shiite	Muslim,	and	the	rest	(0.3	per	cent)	‘other
religions’,	such	as	Hindus,	Sikhs	and	Jews.	There	is	also	total	of	45	native	languages	spoken	in	Afghanistan.
However,	the	constitution	recognises	only	8,	among	which	are	the	official	languages	of	Farsi,	Dari	and	Pashto.
The	2004	Constitution
The	new	Constitution	of	Afghanistan,	adopted	in	2004,	stuck	to	a	unitary	tradition	of	the	country	and	a	presidential
system	of	government	(Article	1),	giving	broad	powers	to	the	president.	The	recognition	of	the	multi-ethnic	character
of	the	country	(Article	4),	however,	was	not	included	in	the	initial	draft	version	of	the	political	document.	It	was	only
upon	insistence	of	the	Constitutional	Loya	Jirga	(Grand	Assembly)	(CLJ),	a	grand	representative	meeting	made	up
of	502	members	of	Afghan	society	that	was	convened	in	accordance	to	the	Bonn	Agreement	from	December	2003
to	January	2004	that	a	debate	was	held	to	ratify	the	draft	constitution.	(The	constitution	was	drafted	by	35-member
Constitutional	Commission	appointed	by	the	Transitional	Authority	of	Afghanistan	in	2003.)
During	this	debate	over	the	constitution,	the	Northern	Alliance	(a	coalition	of	non-Pashtun	groups	which	was	led	by
Tajik,	Uzbek,	Hazara	and	some	other	ethnic	leaders	united	against	the	Taliban)	opposed	what	they	believed	was	a
centralisation	of	power	that	favoured	Pashtuns.	After	failing	in	their	campaign	to	set	up	a	system	in	which
parliament	would	select	a	prime	minister,	the	Alliance	ensured	some	limitations	to	the	power	of	the	president,
mainly	through	the	assignment	of	key	authorities	by	parliament.	The	country’s	newly	installed	presidential	system
however	did	not	leave	the	country	with	a	truly	collective	and	inclusive	executive,	therefore	creating	a	political
system	designed	to	provide	power	to	only	one	winner	from	one	community.	Under	the	terms	of	the	constitution,	for
a	president	to	be	elected,	a	candidate	must	receive	more	than	50	per	cent	or	the	majority	of	votes	(Article	61).	Such
a	crude	measure	does	not	provide	a	structure	of	governance	that	fairly	represents	the	ethnic	divisions	of
Afghanistan’s	multicultural	society,	rather	it	enhances	them.
Elections	and	the	centralisation	of	government
The	negative	consequences	of	a	highly	centralised	structure	of	government	in	Afghanistan	can	be	seen	in	the
country’s	electoral	system.	Afghanistan’s	electoral	system	for	presidential	elections	is	based	on	a	majoritarian
voting	system	that	can	lead	to	the	encouragement	of	ethnic	divisions	among	voters.
Take	the	country’s	first	presidential	elections	in	2004	in	which	Hamid	Karzai	won	with	55	per	cent	of	vote.	Karzai,
the	most	powerful	and	most	internationally	favoured	candidate,	received	the	majority	of	his	votes	from	Pashtuns.
His	Tajik,	Hazara	and	Uzbek	rivals	received	16	per	cent,	11	per	cent	and	10	per	cent	of	the	vote	respectively.
These	other	candidates	did	not	receive	much	support	outside	of	their	ethno-linguistic	group.	The	ethnicity	of	the
candidates	and	the	election	results	therefore	revealed	the	long-standing	ethnic	and	regional	divisions	in
Afghanistan.
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Because	Afghanistan	does	not	have	a	majority	ethnic	group,	candidates	are	forced	to	reach	out	to	other
communities	to	be	elected	rather	than	relying	solely	on	their	own	community.	While	a	Pashtun	candidate	has	to
reach	out	only	to	one	other	group	to	be	elected	other	political	candidates	from	other	ethnic	groups	have	to	form	a
much	larger	coalition.	It	is	therefore	challenging	for	non-Pashtuns	to	win	a	presidential	election.
Karzai	gave	himself	a	good	chance	of	winning	the	2004	elections	by	appointing	a	Tajik	and	a	Hazara	as	vice
presidents.	This	multi-ethnic	ticket	allowed	Karzai	to	win	the	election.	Under	the	constitution,	the	power	to	appoint
all	high-ranking	officials	(a	power	that	includes	not	only	cabinet	ministers	but	also	members	of	the	Supreme	Court,
judges,	provincial	governors	and	district	governors,	local	security	chiefs,	and	members	of	supposedly	independent
commissions)	is	granted	to	one	person:	the	president,	allowing	that	president	to	reward	political	allies	in	their	small
coalitions	such	positions.
NUG’s	failed	inclusive	government
And	then	there	are	the	2014	elections.	The	National	Unity	Government	(NUG),	which	was	the	outcome	of	a	U.S.
brokered	agreement	between	Ashraf	Ghani	and	Abdullah	Abdullah	after	both	claimed	victory	in	2014	presidential
elections,	is	another	failed	attempt	in	establishing	an	inclusive	government,	further	impeded	by	the	Constitution.
The	NUG	was	a	step	towards	formalising	power-sharing	in	Afghanistan,	however	it	failed	to	change	the	strong
centralised	system	of	government.
The	NUG	agreement	included	pledges	to	convene	a	Constitutional	Loya	Jirga	to	amend	the	Constitution	so	that	the
position	of	Chief	Executive	Officer	as	“prime	minister”	was	formalised	within	two	years,	as	well	as	adopt	new
electoral	reforms.	Despite	Abdullah’s	persistence	to	implement	the	deal,	it	was	never	implemented.	Although	the
NUG	looked	to	be	a	step	towards	formalising	a	system	of	power-sharing,	there	were	serious	challenges	and
disagreements	within	the	leadership	as	both	leaders	had	not	been	able	to	bridge	their	fundamental	differences
regarding	their	respective	roles	and	powers.
Tensions	between	both	leaders	created	widely	divergent	interpretations	of	the	NUG	agreement.	Ghani	was	the
main	beneficiary	of	a	centralised	constitutional	framework,	while	the	vaguely	worded	agreement	gave	the	CEO	(a
role	that	lacks	any	constitutional	or	formal	standing)	few	defined	powers	or	responsibilities.	Both	failed	to	agree	on
basic	principles	of	governance	regarding	central	government	and	preferential	bias	toward	ethnicity	in	the
appointment	of	key	posts.
Concerning	the	former,	Ghani	has	been	in	favour	of	creating	a	Kabul-centric	powerhouse,	while	Abdullah	has
argued	for	more	decentralisation.	Ghani’s	push	for	centralisation	has	led	to	more	division	among	Afghan	elites	who
criticise	him	as	being	a	micromanager	and	have	brought	discontent	and	isolation.	Regarding	the	latter,	Ghani	has
been	accused	of	“extreme	Pashtun	nationalism”	and	Abdullah	has	been	accused	of	favouring	Tajiks.
For	instance,	in	2015,	75	per	cent	of	officials	appointed	in	the	President’s	Office	of	Administrative	Affairs	(OAA)
were	Pashtuns.	Moreover,	Ghani	has	side-lined	several	prominent	non-Pashtun	leaders	and	forced	them	out	of	the
unity	government.	Namely	he	forced	his	first	vice	president,	the	Uzbek,	Abdul	Rashid	Dostum,	into	self-imposed
exile	after	accusing	him	of	kidnapping	and	raping	an	elderly	political	opponent.	Instead,	he	has	surrounded	himself
with	ethnonationalist	Pashtun	leaders	and	has	given	his	Pashtun	advisors	full	access	to	government	resources	and
decision-making	authority.
After	Ghani	was	announced	as	the	winner	of	the	2019	presidential	elections,	his	rival	Abdullah	also	claimed	to	be
president,	and	refused	to	accept	defeat	in	the	elections,	establishing	a	parallel	administration	in	a	palace	next	to
Ghani’s	presidential	palace.	Ghani	on	the	other	hand	refuses	any	other	unity	government,	while	Abdullah	still	insists
on	amending	the	constitution	and	creating	a	prime	ministerial	post.	As	a	result,	if	the	problem	is	not	solved
(especially	during	at	a	time	of	relative	peace	with	the	Taliban)	the	country’s	deeper	ethnic	tension	will	be	further
deepened.
The	Electoral	system	and	ethnic	tensions
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In	addition,	the	parliamentary	electoral	system	does	nothing	to	reduce	ethnic	tensions	in	Afghanistan.	Afghanistan’s
electoral	law,	adopted	in	2004,	relies	on	a	Single	Non-Transferrable	Vote	(SNTV)	system	for	parliamentary
elections.	This	system	allows	voters	to	cast	votes	to	individual	candidates	not	to	political	parties.	One	explanation
for	adopting	this	system	was	the	poor	performance	of	advocates	of	closed-list	Proportional	Representation	(PR)
system,	which	benefitted	the	opponents	of	a	PR	system	who	were	worried	about	the	emergence	of	strong	political
parties.
Another	argument	was	Karzai’s	concern	that	the	closed-list	PR	system	would	benefit	the	charismatic	non-Pashtuns,
as	Karzai	wanted	a	fragmented	opposition	in	the	legislature	rather	than	powerful	political	parties.	Opponents	of	the
SNTV	system	warned	about	the	dangers	associated	with	this	system,	mainly	that	voters	would	be	able	to	assess
whether	their	vote	was	wasted	because	under	SNTV	citizens	vote	for	an	individual	not	for	a	political	party	and
individual	candidates	are	elected	only	if	they	win	a	certain	threshold.
What	is	perhaps	most	significant	is	the	ethnic	distribution	of	supporters	and	opponents	of	the	government.	For
instance,	no	Uzbek	supported	the	government	in	the	2005	parliament	while	some	Hazaras	supported	and	opposed
the	government	(the	support	from	Hazaras	was	linked	to	the	inclusion	of	Khalili	as	one	of	Karzai’s	vice	presidents),
but	Uzbeks	opposed	the	government	due	to	feelings	of	underrepresentation.
Prohibition	of	ethnic	parties
The	Constitution	also	prohibits	the	formation	of	parties	based	on	tribalism,	parochialism,	language	and	religious
sectarianism	(Article	35).	The	president	and	cabinet	members	are	prohibited	to	base	their	decisions	on	ethnic	and
regional	considerations	and	from	using	their	posts	for	regional	and	ethnic	purposes	(Article	66	and	80).	The
prohibition	appears	a	logical	way	of	avoiding	discrimination	between	citizens	of	Afghanistan	(Article	22).
Nevertheless,	the	constitutional	ban	on	forming	parties	based	on	language,	ethnicity,	region	and	Islamic	school	of
thought	is	far	more	questionable.	Such	a	prohibition	limits	the	ability	of	ethnic	groups	to	seek	redress	for	any
injustice	or	discrimination	through	the	electoral	process.	This	along	with	the	centralisation	of	power	in	hands	of	the
president,	and	the	weakening	the	role	of	the	parliament,	aggravates	the	feeling	that	smaller	ethnic	groups	are
excluded	from	any	significant	participation	in	government.
How	to	amend	the	Constitution	to	promote	ethnic	diversity
With	all	this	in	mind,	there	are	ways	in	which	governance	in	Afghanistan	can	function	to	decrease	the	political
divisions	between	different	ethnic	groups.	This	could	firstly	be	brought	about	by	amending	the	constitution	and
changing	the	system	of	government	to	federal	or	semi-presidential	system.	Secondly,	reforms	could	be	brought	to
the	current	electoral	system	from	SNTV	to	a	PR	system	to	strengthen	political	parties	and	ensure	a	just	and
inclusive	set	of	representative	rights	for	all	segments.
It	is	in	the	interests	of	each	citizen	of	Afghanistan	that	the	government	adopt	a	new	constitution	based	on	power-
sharing	norms	and	due	regard	to	the	ethnic	and	plural	diversity	of	Afghan	society.	Such	a	change	would	help
stabilise	democracy,	and	ensure	a	broader	representation	of	ethnic,	religious	and	linguistic	diversity	of	the	country
than	the	current	status	quo.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Featured	image:	Crowd	of	People;	Credit:	Clker-Free-Vector-Images,	Pixabay.
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